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AND LOCAL SMOKING ORDINANCES
1. INTRODUCTION
In the months spanning late 2006 and early 2007, two South Carolina circuit
courts confronted nearly identical questions and arrived at astonishingly divergent
conclusions. Both suits stemmed from municipal ordinances that severely curtailed
public smoking within two South Carolina cities. The Charleston County Court of
Common Pleas upheld the smoking ban for Sullivan's Island, finding the local
ordinance was neither unconstitutional nor preempted by the general laws of the
state.' However, less than three months later, the Greenville County Court of
Common Pleas struck down a strikingly similar ordinance as being expressly
preempted by state law and as violating the South Carolina constitution.
2
In addition to causing a problematic trial court split, these decisions raise
doubts as to the validity and enforceability of similar ordinances recently passed in
numerous other South Carolina localities.' In examining these recent court
decisions, this Note explores two primary questions-one a substantive legal
inquiry and the other a normative question of public policy. First, do the general
laws and constitution of South Carolina render local smoking ordinances invalid
and unenforceable? Second, should the general laws and constitution of South
Carolina render local smoking ordinances invalid and unenforceable?
In considering these overarching questions, Part II of this Note briefly lays out
background material including the two local ordinances in question, South
Carolina's Home Rule provisions, relevant state statutes, and an overview of the
two recent circuit court decisions. Part III examines the legal
arguments-particularly those relating to preemption and constitutionality-that
determine if the local ordinances are valid and enforceable. Finally, Part IV focuses
on the policy debate over whether local governments should have the power to ban
1. Order at 20, Beachfront Entr't, Inc. v. Town of Sullivan's Island, No. 2006-CP-1 0-3501 (S.C.
Ct. Com. Pl. Charleston County Dec. 20, 2006), [hereinafter Charleston Order], available at
http://www. sullivansisland-sc. com/PDF / 20Files/Smoking / 20Ordinance / 2OFinal / 20Order%
20FILED%2012-20-06.pdf.
2. Order at 16, Foothills Brewing Concern, Inc. v. City of Greenville, No. 2006-CP-23-7803 (S.C.
Ct. Corn. P1. Greenville County Mar. 8, 2007) [hereinafter Greenville Order], available at
http://www.wcsr.com/resources/pdfs/watkins 030907.pdf, rev'd No. 26467 (S.C. Mar. 31, 2008),
available at http://www.sccourts.org/opinions/ HTMLFiles/SC/26467.htm.
3. See BEAUFORT COUNTY, S.C., CODE §§ 38-101 to -112 (2007), available at
http://www.municode.com/resources/gateway.asp?pid=10400&sid=40; CHARLESTON, S.C., CODE § 21-
132 (2007), available at http://www.municode.com/resources/gateway.asp?pid=10245&sid=40;
COLUMBIA, S.C., CODE §§ 8-215 to -222 (2006), available at http://www.mLunicode.com/resources/
gateway.asp?pid- 13167&sid-40: HILTON HEAD ISLAND, S.C., CODE §§ 9-2-10 to -80 (2007), available
athttp://www.municode.com/resources/gateway.asp?pid=10927&sid=40; MT. PLEASANT, S.C., CODE
§§ 138.01 .11, .99 (2007), available at http://www.afnlegal.com/library/sc/mtpleasant.shtml.
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smoking and considers options available to the General Assembly and local
governments in response to a pending South Carolina Supreme Court ruling.4
11. BACKGROUND
A. The Local Ordinances
On June 20, 2006, the Sullivan's Island Town Council adopted Ordinance 14-
29. 5 After setting forth at some length the council's findings regarding the dangers
of secondhand smoke,6 the Ordinance states that the town council's intent is "to
preserve and improve the health, comfort and environment of the people of
[Sullivan's Island] by limiting exposure to tobacco smoke in the workplace., 7 The
Ordinance then proceeds to require all employers to "provide a smoke free
environment for all employees"8 and to prohibit smoking in all indoor areas in
which any person is employed, 9 specifically including restaurants, bars, and clubs. 0
The Ordinance expressly exempts from its reach the few indoor locations
enumerated in South Carolina's Clean Indoor Air Act of 1990." After providing
exceptions for private homes, designated motel rooms, and certain religious
ceremonies, 12 the Ordinance provides that "[t]he Police and Fire Departments shall
enforce the provisions of this section" with fines "of $500 and/or 30 days injail.'
13
Several months later, the City Council of Greenville adopted Ordinance 2006-
91."4 Like the Sullivan's Island Ordinance, Greenville's Ordinance 2006-91 recites
information regarding the detrimental health effects of secondhand smoke and
states that "in order to protect the health and welfare of the public, it is necessary
to restrict smoking."'" The Ordinance prohibits smoking "in all enclosed public
places within the city" and provides a non-exhaustive list of locations to which the
ban applies, 6 specifically including bars 17 and restaurants. 8 The Ordinance further
4. Immediately prior to the publication of this Note, the South Carolina Supreme Court reached
a decision on the appeal from the Greenville County case. Foothills Brewing Concern, Inc. v. City of
Greenville, No. 26467 (S.C. Mar. 31, 2008), available at http://www.sccourts.org/opinions/
HTMLFiles/SC/26467.htm. In its opinion, the supreme court reversed the lower court, finding that state
law did not preempt the Greenville Ordinance and that the Ordinance did not violate the state
constitution. Id.
5. SULLIVAN'S ISLAND, S.C., CODE § 14-29 (SIC 30) (2007), available at
http://www.sullivansisland-sc.com/Ordinances/Secl4.pdf
6. Id. § 14-29 (SIC 30)(A).
7. Id. § 14-29 (SIC 30)(B).
8. Id. § 14-29 (SIC 30)(D)(1).
9. Id. § 14-29 (SIC 30)(D)(2).
10. See id. § 14-29 (SIC 30)(C)(10) (11) (providing definitions of"Workplace" and"Work Space
or [W]ork Spaces").
11. Id. § 14-29 (SIC 30)(E); see also S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-95-10 to -60 (2002) (Clean Air Act
of 1990).
12. SULLIVAN'S ISLAND, S.C., CODE § 14-29 (SIC 30)(F).
13. Id. § 14-29(SIC 30)(1).
14. GREENVILLE, S.C., CODE §§ 16-161 to -179 (2007), available at http://vww.municode.com/
Resources/gateway.asp?pid 13105&sid-40.
15. Id. § 16-161.
16. Id. § 16-164.
17. Id. § 16-164(c).
18. Id. § 16-164(o).
[Vol. 59: 475
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prohibits smoking "in all enclosed areas within places of employment without
exception"' 9 and "in certain outdoor areas when the use involves a gathering of the
public," such as parades, stadiums, and zoos. 2° After setting forth several
exemptions,2' the Ordinance provides that "the office of the city manager or an
authorized designee" will enforce the prohibition22 and that a smoker violating the
ban will be punished by a fine of between ten and twenty-five dollars.23
Additionally, an employer whose establishment fails to comply will be punished by
a similar fine with repeated violations potentially resulting in the suspension or
revocation of the employer's business license.24
B. Home Rule
The ability of local governments to pass such ordinances is a relatively recent
addition to South Carolina's political landscape. Prior to the 1970s, control over
local affairs was retained by the General Assembly and exercised by the legislative
delegates representing that locale.25 However, in a 1972 referendum, South
Carolinians voted to amend article VIII of the South Carolina constitution to
expand the powers of local governments.26 The General Assembly ratified this
amendment the next year,2 7 thus giving county and municipal governments greater
freedom from state control a freedom frequently called Home Rule.28
Now included in article VIII of the South Carolina constitution is the provision
that "[t]he structure and organization, powers, duties, functions, and responsibilities
of the municipalities shall be established by general law."2 9 In accordance with this
mandate, the General Assembly duly enacted general laws establishing the design
and obligations of city governments. One such statute is section 5-7-30 of the South
Carolina Code, which states the following:
Each municipality of the State ... may enact regulations,
resolutions, and ordinances, not inconsistent with the Constitution
andgeneral law of this State, including the exercise of powers in
relation to roads, streets, markets, law enforcement, health, and
order in the municipality or respecting any subject which appears
to it necessary and proper for the security, general welfare, and
convenience of the municipality or for preserving health, peace,
order, and good government in it.... The municipal governing
body may fix fines and penalties for the violation of municipal
19. Id. § 16-165.
20. Id. § 16-166.
21. Id. § 16-168.
22. Id. § 16-172.
23. Id. § 16-173(a).
24. Id. § 16-173(b)-(c).
25. Hospitality Ass'n of S.C. v. County of Charleston, 320 S.C. 219, 224, 464 S.E.2d 113, 117
(1995).
26. Id. at 225, 464 S.E.2d at 117.
27. See Act of Mar. 7, 1973, No. 63, 1973 S.C. Acts 67.
28. See id.
29. S.C. CONST. art. Vill, § 9.
2008]
3
Coleman: Banning the Flames: Constitutionality, Preemption, and Local Smok
Published by Scholar Commons, 2008
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ordinances and regulations not exceeding five hundred dollars or
imprisonment not exceeding thirty days, or both. 0
Courts have interpreted this power broadly, limiting municipal power only by
the statutory requirement that the local enactment "may not be inconsistent with the
Constitution and general law of this State."'" Additionally, "the broad grant of
power stated at the beginning of [section 5-7-30] is not limited by the [specific
powers] mentioned in the remainder of the statute.
' 32
While Home Rule generally gives local governments broad power and a
favorable presumption regarding their legislative actions, 3 article VIII places some
firm boundaries on the extent of this power. Particularly relevant here is the
following provision: "In enacting provisions required or authorized by this article,
general law provisions applicable to the following matters shall not be set
aside: ...criminal laws and the penalties and sanctions for the transgression
thereof. 3 4 The South Carolina Supreme Court has construed this provision as
prohibiting "a municipality from proscribing conduct that is not unlawful under
State criminal laws governing the same subject. ' '35 Thus, proper analysis of a local
ordinance passed pursuant to the Home Rule provisions demands at least a general
familiarity with any roughly parallel state laws.
C. Relevant State Statutes
A survey of similar state statutes is rather simplified in the context of smoking
ordinances because only two South Carolina statutes are implicated. First, the Clean
Indoor Air Act of 1990 (CIAA)"6 prohibits smoking in limited enumerated indoor
areas but allows smoking in all other areas, including restaurants and bars. 7 It also
provides for the designation of smoking and nonsmoking areas in establishments
that choose to permit smoking.38 A violation is punishable as a misdemeanor
carrying a ten to twenty-five dollar fine. 9
Second, in 1996, the General Assembly passed Act 445, which addressed
smoking and tobacco products.4" Specifically, Act 445 amended section 44-95-20
of the CIAA 41 and added to the South Carolina Code sections 16-17-500 to -504,
30. S.C. CODE ANN. § 5-7-30 (2004) (emphasis added).
31. Hospitality Ass'n of S.C. v. County of Charleston, 320 S.C. 219, 227, 464 S.E.2d 113, 118
(1995) (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 5-7-30); see also Town of Hilton Head Island v. Fine Liquors, Ltd.,
302 S.C. 550, 553, 397 S.E.2d 662, 664 (1990) (discussing what constitutes a conflict between
municipal ordinances and state law).
32. Hospitality Ass'n, 320 S.C. at 227, 464 S.E.2d at 118.
33. See S.C. CONST. art. VIII, § 17 ("[A]ll laws concerning local government shall be liberally
construed in their favor.").
34. S.C. CONST. art. Vill, § 14.
35. Connor v. Town of Hilton Head Island, 314 S.C. 251, 254, 442 S.E.2d 608, 609 (1994).
36. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-95-10 to -60 (2002).
37. Id. § 44-95-20 (prohibiting smoking in public schools, indoor facilities providing children's
services, healthcare facilities, government buildings, elevators, public transportation, and "arenas and
auditoriums of public theaters or public performing art centers").
38. Id. § 44-95-30.
39. Id. § 44-95-50.
40. See Act of June 18, 1996, No. 445, 1996 S.C. Acts 2691.
41. Id. § 1.
[Vol. 59: 475
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which prohibit the sale or distribution of tobacco to minors.42 Section 16-17-504
provides, "Any laws, ordinances, or rules enacted pertaining to tobacco products
may not supersede state law or regulation., 43 The interpretation of this clause is the
primary issue in determining the validity of local smoking ordinances.
D. The Circuit Court Decisions
In the earlier of the two recent cases, Bert's Bar and several of its employees
challenged Sullivan's Island Town Ordinance 14-29, seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief.4 4 The Charleston County Court of Common Pleas granted
summary judgment for the Town of Sullivan's Island, holding the Ordinance to be
valid and enforceable.4 5 In upholding the ban, the court analyzed the Ordinance
under a "presumption of validity '4 6 and found that "no language in the Clean Indoor
Air Act ...suggests, or compels, the conclusion that the General Assembly
proposed to preclude local regulation in the area of indoor smoking";47 thus, the
Ordinance is not expressly preempted. The court ruled further that the Ordinance
"does not necessarily implicate the criminalization of conduct allowed under state
law,"48 and thus does not run afoul of article VIII, section 14. Crucial to this
holding is the court's conclusion that section 16-17-504 applies only to the
distribution of tobacco to minors and not to local smoking ordinances such as
Sullivan's Island's 14-29. 49
In contrast, the Greenville County Court of Common Pleas granted Foothills
Brewing Concern a declaratory judgment and permanently enjoined the City of
Greenville from enforcing Ordinance 2006-91.50 The court found that "Ordinance
2006-91 is expressly preempted" by section 16-17-504 of the South Carolina
Code"' and that the Ordinance "has criminalized conduct that is not illegal under
State criminal laws governing the same subject," thus rendering the Ordinance
unconstitutional. 2 The bulk of the order is devoted to the discussion of preemption
and an analysis of the CIAA and the 1996 amendments particularly the scope and
meaning of section 16-17-504-concluding ultimately that the CIAA operates to
preempt local ordinances such as Greenville's 2006-91. 53
Il1. LEGAL ARGUMENTS AND ANALYSIS
Ultimately, the legal question presented is whether the general laws and
constitution of South Carolina leave local smoking ordinances invalid and
unenforceable. South Carolina courts apply a simple, two-step test to determine the
42. Id. § 2.
43. S.C. CODEANN. § 16-17-504 (2003).
44. Charleston Order, supra note 1, at 1.
45. Id. at 20.
46. Id. at 5 (citing Casey v. Richland County Council, 282 S.C. 87, 320 S.E.2d 443 (1994)).
47. Id. at 8.
48. Id. at 18.
49. See id. at 10 11.
50. See Greenville Order, supra note 2, at 16.
51. Id. at 14.
52. Id. at 15.
53. See id. at 14.
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validity of a local ordinance. 54 First, courts examine "whether the municipality had
the power to enact the ordinance. 5 5 Here, both the Greenville court and Charleston
court agreed that the local smoking ordinances in question fell within the Home
Rule power.56 The second step in determining a local ordinance's validity is to
ascertain "whether the ordinance is consistent with the Constitution and general law
of the State. 57 This is where the Charleston court and the Greenville court came to
radically different conclusions. The question is primarily one of statutory
interpretation, determining specifically whether these ordinances are preempted by
certain state laws or are in violation of the South Carolina constitution. Numerous
other states' courts have faced similar questions, 58 and while their analyses may be
interesting and even insightful, the resolution of this question turns ultimately on
whether specific municipal ordinances are preempted by specific South Carolina
statutes and constitutional provisions.
A. Preemption
Preemption doctrine holds that in a hierarchical system of government, if there
is a conflict between laws passed by two different levels of government, the law of
the superior level trumps that of the subordinate level. For example, "Where a state
statute conflicts with, or frustrates, federal law, the former must give way.
5 9
Preemption can take several forms, and while different labels or categories of
preemption are not "rigidly distinct,"6 courts have widely adopted a standard
nomenclature for analysis of these claims.
Preemption typically falls into one of two categories express or implied;
however, because courts frequently identify two distinct types of implied
preemption, their analyses often appear to consider three types. 6' Express
54. Denene, Inc. v. City of Charleston, 352 S.C. 208, 211, 574 S.E.2d 196, 198 (2002)
("Determining whether a local ordinance is valid is a two-step process." (citing Bugsy's v. City of
Myrtle Beach, 340 S.C. 87, 530 S.E.2d 890 (2000))).
55. Id. at 212, 574 S.E.2d at 198.
56. See Charleston Order, supra note 1, at 7; Greenville Order, supra note 2, at 5.
57. Denene, 352 S.C. at 212, 574 S.E.2d at 198 (citing Bugsy's, 340 S.C. 87, 530 S.E.2d 890).
58. See, e.g., City of Tucson v. Grezaffi, 23 P.3d 675, 680 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) (upholding a
local smoking ban and finding that state statutes show no legislative intent to preempt municipal
regulation); James Enters., Inc. v. City of Ames, 661 N.W.2d 150, 153 (Iowa 2003) (finding that state
law supersedes conflicting provisions in the city's public smoking ban); Mich. Rest. Ass'n v. City of
Marquette, 626 N.W.2d 418, 421-22 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001) (holding a city ordinance was preempted
by a state statute requiring a minimum number of nonsmoking seats in restaurants); JTR Colebrook, Inc.
v. Town of Colebrook, 829 A.2d 1089, 1091 (N.H. 2003) (holding that the State Indoor Smoking Act
is a comprehensive and detailed scheme that preempted a town ordinance prohibiting smoking in any
restaurant); Traditions Tavern v. City of Columbus, 870 N.E.2d 1197, 1203-04 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006)
(finding that a local smoking ban was neither unconstitutionally vague nor in conflict with a
noncomprehensive state law mandating no-smoking areas in all public places); Found. for Indep. Living
v. Cabell-Huntington Bd. of Health, 591 S.E.2d 744, 749 (W. Va. 2003) (holding that local boards of
health have the authority to adopt regulations prohibiting smoking in enclosed public places).
59. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 663 (1993) (citing U.S. CONST., art. V1, cl.
2; Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)).
60. See English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 n.5 (1990).
61. See, e.g., id. at 78 ("Our cases have established that state law is pre-empted ... in three
circumstances."); Mich. Canners & Freezers Ass'n v. Agric. Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461,
469 (1984) ("Federal law may pre-empt state law in any of three ways."); S.C. State Ports Auth. v.
[Vol. 59: 475
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preemption involves an explicit statutory statement that no subordinate
governmental authority may interfere with the statutory scheme.62 Implied
preemption occurs when a statutory scheme is so pervasive that it leaves no room
for a state or municipality to supplement it-field preemption3-or when
compliance with both the state and the local law is impossible-conflict
preemption.64
While preemption analysis is generally associated with conflicts between
federal and state laws, it also applies to conflicts between state and local laws. 65 Just
as a federal statute can preempt a state law, a state statute can preempt a local
ordinance. Here, the inquiry is whether the CIAA or section 16-17-504 expressly
or impliedly preempts local ordinances like those in Greenville and Sullivan's
Island. The CIAA clearly lacks any express preemptive clause, and both circuit
courts agree that it contains no implicit preemption of local smoking ordinances.66
Therefore, the outcome-determinative question is the scope of section 16-17-504,
specifically its provision that "[a]ny laws, ordinances, or rules enacted pertaining
to tobacco products may not supersede state law or regulation. 67 If this language
applies only to the immediately preceding statutes, which deal with the distribution
of tobacco products to minors, then the local ordinances are not expressly
preempted. However, if the scope of this language is truly as broad as it arguably
appears, local smoking ordinances may fall within its ambit.
1. Implied Preemption
The first of the two types of implied preemption-field preemption-occurs
either "when the state statutory scheme so thoroughly and pervasively covers the
subject so as to occupy the field or when the subject mandates statewide
uniformity. '68 Collectively, the Charleston County and Greenville County circuit
courts advanced three persuasive reasons why the field of smoking ordinances is
not preempted by state law. First, the limited reach of the CIAA does not indicate
that it is a thorough or pervasive legislative scheme.6 9 The statute touches only on
Jasper County, 368 S.C. 388, 396, 629 S.E.2d 624, 628 (2006) ("We find it appropriate to address the
[plaintiffs] preemption arguments using the three categories previously recognized .... ").
62. See Michigan Canners, 467 U.S. at 469 ("[1]n enacting the federal law, Congress may
explicitly define the extent to which it intends to pre-empt state law.").
63. See English, 496 U.S. at 79 ("[Preemptive] intent may be inferred from a scheme of federal
regulation... so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States
to supplement it .... (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)) (first
omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
64. See id. ("[T]he Court has found pre-emption where it is impossible for a private party to
comply with both state and federal requirements ...." (citing Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 43 (1963))).
65. See, e.g., S.C. State PortsAuth., 368 S.C. at 395 401,629 S.E.2d at 627 30 (using preemption
analysis to determine that state legislation did not preempt local regulation); Denene, Inc. v. City of
Charleston, 352 S.C. 208, 211-15, 574 S.E.2d 196, 198-200 (2003) (holding that a local alcohol sale
ordinance was not preempted by state law).
66. See Charleston Order, supra note 1, at 13; Greenville Order, supra note 2, at 7.
67. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-504(A) (2003).
68. S.C. State Ports Auth., 368 S.C. at 397, 629 S.E.2d at 628.
69. See Charleston Order, supra note 1, at 13.
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specific enumerated areas, 7° and does not address the vast number of places that are
not mentioned expressly. Second, the CIAA actually gives local entities discretion
in implementing its policies. 7' For example, section 44-95-20 provides for limited
smoking areas at schools but allows a local school board to completely ban
smoking at the facility.72 Similar discretion is granted for healthcare facilities and
legislative office buildings. 73 Finally, implied field preemption appears to be a
disfavored doctrine in South Carolina. The South Carolina Supreme Court "has
been reluctant to hold that a state statute preempts an entire field" and "has never
done so.,"
74
Additionally, the Greenville circuit court order proposed another argument
against finding field preemption: The legislature, in enacting section 16-17-504(B),
recognized and approved of existing local ordinances.75 The section states,
"Smoking ordinances in effect before the effective date of this act are exempt from
the requirements of [section 16-17-504(A)]. '76 Had the legislature intended to
occupy the entire field, it would not have carved out this exception for extant local
regulations. While the court acknowledged that this argument assumes a debatable
conclusion-that section 16-17-504 has any bearing at all on the CIAA or local
smoking ordinances 77 if correct, the argument supplies additional evidence that
the general laws of the state do not imply intent to preempt the field of smoking
regulation.
The Charleston circuit court considered a second type of implied
preemption conflict preemption. 78 To find conflict preemption, a court "must
determine whether there is a conflict between the ordinance and the statutes and
whether the ordinance creates any obstacle to the fulfillment of . . .State
objectives. ' ,79 This standard requires actual contradiction between the laws in
question, not mere variance:
[I]n order for there to be a conflict between a state statute and a
municipal ordinance both must contain either express or implied
conditions which are inconsistent or irreconcilable with each
other. Mere differences in detail do not render them conflicting.
If either is silent where the other speaks, there can be no conflict
between them. Where no conflict exists, both laws stand.80
70. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-95-20 (2002) (prohibiting smoking in public schools, childcare
facilities, healthcare facilities, government buildings, elevators, public transportation, and arenas and
auditoriums).
71. Charleston Order, supra note 1, at 8.
72. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-95-20(1).
73. Id. § 44-95-20(3)-(4).
74. Greenville Order, supra note 2, at 7.
75. Id. at 8 9.
76. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-504(B) (2003).
77. See Greenville Order, supra note 2, at 10.
78. See Charleston Order, supra note 1, at 15.
79. Id. (quoting Peoples Program for Endangered Species v. Sexton, 323 S.C. 526, 530, 476
S.E.2d 477, 480 (1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
80. Id. (quoting Town of Hilton Head lsland v. Fine Liquors, Ltd., 302 S.C. 550, 553, 397 S.E.2d
662, 664 (1990)) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
[Vol. 59: 475
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The Charleston court concluded that this level of conflict is simply not present
between the state law and the Sullivan's Island smoking ordinance.8 First, the
Sullivan's Island ordinance states expressly that it does not apply to those areas that
fall under the CIAA. 2 Second, the state law and local law apply to different subject
matters-the local ordinance regulates employers and employees while the CIAA
regulates all smoking members of the public. 3 Because "[c]ompliance can be had
with both the Ordinance and the Act," the court ultimately concluded that there is
no implied conflict preemption. 4
2. Express Preemption
While the Charleston and Greenville courts generally agreed on the issue of
implied preemption, their reasoning and conclusions diverged sharply on the issue
of express preemption particularly on the interpretation of section 16-17-504. In
analyzing this section, its context is particularly important. Title 16 deals with
"Crimes and Offenses" and chapter 17 concerns "Offenses Against Public Policy."
Within that chapter, and immediately preceding section 16-17-504, are several
sections relating to "tobacco products" and "tobacco product samples. '5 Sections
16-17-500 and -502 prohibit the distribution of tobacco to minors, 6 and sections
16-17-501 and -503 provide definitions and enforcement power.8 7 Following
immediately on the heels of these provisions is section 16-17-504, which states the
following:
(A) Sections 16-17-500, 16-17-502, and 16-17-503 must be
implemented in an equitable and uniform manner throughout the
State and enforced to ensure the eligibility for and receipt of
federal funds or grants the State receives or may receive relating
to the sections. Any laws, ordinances, or rules enactedpertaining
to tobacco products may not supersede state law or regulation.
Nothing herein shall affect the right of any person having
ownership or otherwise controlling private property to allow or
prohibit the use of tobacco products on such property.
(B) Smoking ordinances in effect before the effective date of this
act are exempt from the requirements of subsection (A).8'
The major point of contention is whether the italicized clause applies only to
distribution of tobacco to minors or if it applies to all local ordinances that in any
way touch on tobacco, thus expressly preempting local ordinances like the smoking
bans challenged here.
81. Id. at 15 16.
82. Id. at 18.
83. Id. at 16 .
84. See id. at 15.
85. See S.C. CODEANN. §§ 16-17-500 to -503 (2003).
86. Id. §§ 16-17-500,-502.
87. Id. §§ 16-17-501,-503.
88. Id. § 16-17-504(A), (B) (emphasis added).
2008]
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a. Context of Section 16-17-504's Enactment
The first argument posed is that the proscription in section 16-17-504 should
apply broadly because it was accomplished in an act that also modified the CIAA.89
While the Greenville court simply stated this conclusion, 90 the Charleston court
considered the argument at some length and ultimately rejected it.9' The Charleston
court concluded that "Act 445 [, which added sections 16-17-500 to -504] addressed
related, but distinct, subject matters, i.e., Title 16, crimes and offenses pertaining
to the distribution of tobacco products to minors, and Title 44, health, related to
indoor smoking." 92 This conclusion was based on the court's understanding that the
statute's prohibition is designed solely to assure compliance with federal funding
requirements conditioned on the state's outlawing tobacco distribution to minors. 9'
However, regardless of one's reading of Act 445, interpretation of a statute is
generally based on a law as codified, not on the context in which it was enacted;
94
thus, this first argument carries minimal probative weight.
b. Scope of Section 16-17-504's Language
A second issue regarding the breadth of section 16-17-504 revolves around the
scope of the particular language used in the statute itself. The Greenville court
argued that "the language used is so broad as to indicate that the General Assembly
intended the section's application to be broader than the prohibition of furnishing
tobacco products to minors.""5 The court contended that the second sentence of
section 16-17-504 broadens the scope of application to include all use of tobacco
products; if the legislature had intended to confine the scope of this sentence to the
preceding material, the General Assembly could have explicitly done so. 96 In
contrast, the Charleston court applied a different presumption and claimed that if
the legislature intended to expressly preempt the subject of indoor smoking, it could
have done so in the CIAA rather than in an obscure sentence buried in a provision
related to tobacco products and minors.97 This view is particularly persuasive
89. See Greenville Order, supra note 2, at 11; Charleston Order, supra note 1, at 9.
90. See Greenville Order, supra note 2, at 11.
91. See Charleston Order, supra note 1, at 9 & n.3.
92. Id. at 9.
93. See id. at 10.
94. See, e.g., State v. Pittman, 373 S.C. 527, 561, 647 S.E.2d 144, 161 (2007) ("Whenever
possible, legislative intent should be found in theplain language of the statute itself." (emphasis added)
(citing Whitner v. State, 328 S.C. 1, 6, 492 S.E.2d 777, 779 (1997))). Several cases that interpret statutes
in light of their enactment appear initially to support the Greenville court's argument. See, e.g., White
v. State, 375 S.C. 1,7, 649 S.E.2d 172, 175 (Ct. App. 2007) ("Statutes that are part of the same act must
be read together." (citing Bums v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 297 S.C. 520, 522, 377 S.E.2d 569,
570 (1989))); Busby v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 280 S.C. 330, 333, 312 S.E.2d 716, 718 (Ct.
App. 1984) (interpreting a statute in light of another section enacted in the same act). However, in
application, these cases interpret statutory provisions that are codified in the same code chapter.
Additionally, Busby has been interpreted as standing for the proposition that "the statute must be read
as a whole." Smalls v. Weed, 293 S.C. 364, 370, 360 S.E.2d 531, 534 (Ct. App. 1987) (per curiam)
(emphasis added) (citing Busby, 280 S.C. 330, 312 S.E.2d 716).
95. Greenville Order, supra note 2, at 11.
96. See id. atI 1-12.
97. See Charleston Order, supra note 1, at 12.
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considering that the legislature amended the CIAA in the same act and, had it
intended to do so, could easily have put any preemptive language directly into that
statute. Both courts' arguments have some facial appeal-the sweep of the language
is very broad; on the other hand, it seems odd that the legislature would use a rather
obscure provision in title 16 to modify the CIAA in title 44. In the end, when
examining only the text of the statute, the language of section 16-17-504 is
admittedly ambiguous; however, its lack of a clear connection to the CIAA is not
ambiguous. Seemingly, the scope of section 16-17-504 is not wide enough to
expressly preempt the local smoking ordinances at issue here.
c. Principles of Statutory Construction
One ofthe primary distinctions driving the conflicting outcomes reached by the
two circuit courts is the underlying principle of statutory construction on which
each court focuses. In its analysis, the Greenville court relied heavily on "the
principle of statutory construction that a statute must be interpreted in such a way
that each portion of it has some meaning or effect.""8 On this basis, the court
concluded that the only way the problematic sentence in section 16-17-504 has any
effect is to interpret it broadly enough to apply to local smoking bans.99 The court
also noted that under this canon of statutory interpretation, a broad interpretation
of the ambiguous sentence is necessary to give meaning to section 16-17-504(B)
and to the last sentence of section 16-17-504(A). °°
This canon of interpretation, known as the rule against surplusage, is generally
recognized but is far from absolute.'0 ' In essence, this canon "assumes that every
word in a statute contributes something to the text's meaning. ' 'l °2 While it is
frequently cited, this rule can be somewhat problematic and should be applied with
caution, because it "is not a very reliable indicator of how texts are written and
read, especially legal texts."'0 3 Although courts prefer to "avoid an interpretation
of a statute that 'renders some words altogether redundant, ' -104 the fact is that
legislatures are often redundant and will "repeat themselves out of an abundance
of caution to assure a result."'' 0 5 The rule against surplusage is arguably best used
to interpret words in close proximity to one another, and is often used to determine
the meaning of a word when compared to others in the same statute that could
98. Greenville Order, supra note 2, at 11 12.
99. See id.
100. See id. at 13; supra text accompanying note 88.
101. See Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455, 2461 n.1 (2006)
("While it is generally presumed that statutes do not contain surplusage, instances of surplusage are not
unknown."); Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 536 (2004) ("Surplusage does not always produce
ambiguity and our preference for avoiding surplusage constructions is not absolute."). But see Bruner
v. Smith, 188 S.C. 75, 82, 198 S.E. 184, 187 (1938) ("[W]ords may be regarded as surplusage under
some circumstances, but generally speaking they should be given effect ifpossible." (emphasis added)).
102. WILLIAM D. POPKIN, A DICTIONARY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 198 (2007).
103. Id.
104. United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 59 (1997) (quoting Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S.
561, 574 (1995)).
105. POPKIN, supra note 102, at 198.
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arguably subsume it.' °6 But the rule loses much of its persuasive force when applied
to entire sentences making up a significant part of a statute. The Greenville court
was certainly correct when it observed that much of section 16-17-504 is rather
vague and potentially redundant; however, that is how legislatures often operate.
0 7
The Charleston court, on the other hand, relied on a different underlying
presumption in construing section 16-17-504. The Charleston court focused on the
""presumption of validity [that] attaches to local ordinances, especially those relating
to police powers."'0 8 This focus, combined with a narrow construction of section
16-17-504, gives much greater power to municipalities to regulate indoor smoking.
With regard to the statement in section 16-17-504 that "[a]ny laws, ordinances or
rules enacted pertaining to tobacco products may not supersede state law or
regulation,"'' 0 9 the Charleston court concluded that this language applies only to the
distribution of tobacco products to minors-a topic where statewide uniformity is
necessary to preserve eligibility for federal funds."0 The court found similar
meaning in the statute's exemption of private property because "[u]niformity of
regulation in the private sector was not necessary to preserve eligibility for federal
grants.""' Likewise, the Charleston court found the exemption in section 16-17-
504(B) preexisting local ordinances remain unaffected" 2 "is likewise restricted
to the requirements of subsection (A), and sanctions existing local regulations as
to tobacco and minors.
' 1
3
The Charleston court's conclusions initially seem contrary to the broad, plain
wording of the statute, but they have one potentially redeeming argument the
statute's seemingly sweeping reference to tobacco products is actually a term with
a specific, narrow meaning. In comparing the CJAA with section 16-17-504, the
court noted that the "specific language of the statutes is compelling as to the intent
of the Legislature."' 14 Specifically, sections 16-17-500 to -504 repeatedly reference
"tobacco products."' ' In contrast, the CIAA never uses that term, and instead uses
the words "smoke," "smoking," and "lighted smoking material."'' 6 The court
106. See, e.g., Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2461 n.1 (using the rule to interpret '"costs"' and
",expenses"' in 20 U.S.C. § 1415); Lanie, 540 U.S. at 530, 536 (finding intentional redundancy in the
statutory phrase "trustee, examiner, professional person, or attorney"); State v. Graves, 269 S.C. 356,
363 64, 237 S.E.2d 584, 587 88 (1977) (employing the rule to find that South Carolina Code
section 56-5-400 provides two distinct definitions when it defines a "driver" as a "person who drives
or is in actual physical control of a vehicle"); Abraham v. Palmetto Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 343 S.C.
36, 48 50, 538 S.E.2d 656, 662 63 (Ct. App. 2000) (interpreting the language of South Carolina Code
section 24-25-70(7) "state and average school supplement pay scales" as referring to two distinct
things).
107. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-23-60 (2003) ("Every person accused... [has a right] to meet
the witnesses produced against him face to face."). This statute confers a right already recognized by
the South Carolina constitution in article I, section 14 and by the United States Constitution in the Sixth
Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 14.
108. Charleston Order, supra note 1, at 5 (citing Casey v. Richland County Council, 282 S.C. 387,
320 S.E.2d 443 (1984)).
109. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-504(A).
110. See Charleston Order, supra note 1, at 10-11.
111. Id. at 11.
112. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-504(B).
113. Charleston Order, supra note 1, at 12.
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concluded that this "specific language used by the legislature is a clear indication
of their intention to delineate between 'smoking' . . . and the 'distribution' of
tobacco products." '" In the Charleston court's view, the word choice in the CIAA
emphasizes its focus on the act of smoking, and the word choice of section 16-17-
504 emphasizes its focus on theproduct smoked. Under this logic, the term tobacco
products becomes essentially a term of art that limits the scope of the otherwise
broad language of section 16-17-504.
To summarize, the preemption analysis yields only arguments, not answers.
Both courts agreed that the general laws of the state do not impliedly preempt the
local ordinances; however, there is neither consensus nor a clear answer to the
express preemption arguments. Section 16-17-504 is ambiguous and thus there is
no decisive outcome. However, the Charleston court's reasoning and outcome seem
to comport more closely to the requirement of the Home Rule provisions that local
powers "be liberally construed in favor of the municipality" and the presumption
of validity that accompanies such ordinances."'
B. Constitutionality
In addition to compliance with the general laws of the state, local ordinances
must also pass muster under the South Carolina constitution. Concerning this
determination, local ordinances carry a strong presumption of constitutionality." 9
The burden of proving the unconstitutionality of a local ordinance falls on the
challenger, 2 ° who must "negate every conceivable basis that might support it.'
2'
Regarding the constitutionality of the smoking ordinances at issue, the evaluation
hinges on article VIII, section 14, which mandates that certain general law
provisions, including those relating to criminal laws and penalties, "shall not be set
aside."' 2 2 In Connor v. Town of Hilton Head,123 the South Carolina Supreme Court
interpreted this constitutional provision as prohibiting a city from criminalizing
conduct that is not criminal under state laws governing the same topic. 124 Under a
strict application of this interpretation, the ordinances at issue here are arguably
unconstitutional because they criminalize conduct that is not prohibited by state
smoking laws.
117. Id.
118. S.C. CODE ANN. § 5-7-10 (2004); see also S.C. CONST. art. VIII, § 17 ("The provisions of
this Constitution and all laws concerning local government shall be liberally construed in their favor.").
119. See, e.g., Sunset Cay, LLC v. City of Folly Beach, 357 S.C. 414, 425, 593 S.E.2d 462, 467
(2004) ("A municipal ordinance is a legislative enactment and is presumed to be constitutional."
(quoting Whaley v. Dorchester County Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 337 S.C. 568, 575, 524 S.E.2d 404, 408
(1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
120. Id.
121. City of Beaufort v. Holcombe, 369 S.C. 643, 649, 632 S.E.2d 894, 897 (Ct. App. 2006)
(citing Town of Scranton v. Willoughby, 306 S.C. 421, 422, 412 S.E.2d 424, 425 (1991)); see also
Peoples Program for Endangered Species v. Sexton, 323 S.C. 526, 532, 476 S.E.2d 477, 481 (1996)
("Ordinances are presumed constitutional and their unconstitutionality must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt." (citing Rothschild v. Richland County Bd. ofAdjustment, 309 S.C. 194, 420 S.E.2d
853 (1992))).
122. S.C. CONST. art. VIII, § 14.
123. 314 S.C. 251,442 S.E.2d 608 (1994).
124. Id. at 254, 442 S.E.2d at 609.
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However, the Connor rule is problematic for several reasons. First, the court
developed the rule in a somewhat conclusory fashion, with little explanation or
analysis.' 2 5 Second, Connor seems to establish a rule that is quite different from the
actual prohibition contained in the constitution. Article VIII, section 14 states that
local laws may not set aside a state law.'26 A plain interpretation of this language
does not mandate statewide uniformity but indicates that there should not be
inconsistency between state and local laws.' 2 7 For example, a local ordinance that
mandated an action prohibited by state law would clearly "set aside" or be in direct
conflict with that law. However, under the Connor rule, a local ordinance that
merely enhances or expands on state law and provides for misdemeanor penalties
is unconstitutional. The effect of this rule is to make all conduct lawful, even if
prohibited by local ordinance, as long as such conduct is not proscribed directly by
the state legislature.' 28
An additional problem with the Connor rule is that it severely curtails a local
government's ability to legislate. A city's noise ordinance prohibiting honking, for
example, proscribes conduct related to motor vehicles.'29 The regulation of motor
vehicles is atypical subject of state statutes. 3 ' Accordingly, under the Connor rule,
a city ordinance prohibiting honking is arguably unconstitutional. If extended to the
limits of its logic, the Connor rule is a significant limit on the ability of local
governments to legislate on any subject. Thus, Connor effectively eviscerates the
powers conferred on municipalities by section 5-7-30.1"
Finally, the Connor rule is troublesome because the rule itself conflicts with the
South Carolina constitution. The plain meaning of article VITT, section 14 seems
clear;" 2 however, even if the language were vague, the interpretation should err on
the side of deference to local governments. Only a few sections later, the South
Carolina constitution provides, "The provisions of this Constitution and all laws
concerning local government shall be liberally construed in their favor."' 33 The
South Carolina Supreme Court, if given an opportunity, should limit or clarify the
Connor rule, thus restoring local governments' power to reasonably regulate
conduct within their jurisdictions. 1
4
125. See id.
126. S.C. CONST. art. VIII, § 14.
127. See Palmetto Princess v. Town of Edisto Beach, 369 S.C. 50, 54, 631 S.E.2d 76, 78 (2006)
(Burnett, J., dissenting) ("Article VIII, [section] 14 does notrequire statewide uniformity ofgeneral law
provisions .... The plain meaning of this provision requires local enactments 'set aside' some existing
provision of the general law before a constitutional violation occurs." (quoting Diamonds v. Greenville
County, 325 S.C. 154, 161, 480 S.E.2d 718, 721 (1997) (Burnett, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
128. See id. at 55, 631 S.E.2d at 79.
129. See, e.g., COLUMBIA, S.C., CODE §§ 8-62 to -63 (making unlawful the honking of a horn in
any circumstance not required by law).
130. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 56-1-5 to -32-20 (2006 & Supp. 2007) (regulating a multitude
of issues pertaining to motor vehicles).
131. See supra text accompanying notes 30-32.
132. See supra text accompanying note 122.
133. S.C. CONST. art. Vill, § 17.
134. In its recent decision, the supreme court arguably limited, or at least clarified, the Connor
rule. The supreme court found that the Connor rule applies only to criminal laws. Foothills Brewing
Concern, Inc. v. City of Greenville, No. 26467 (S.C. Mar. 31, 2008) ("Since Town has crinlinalhed
conduct that is not unlawful under relevant State law, we conclude Town exceeded its power in enacting
[Vol. 59: 475
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Separate from the question of the current state of the law is a broader normative
question: Should the general laws and constitution of South Carolina make local
smoking ordinances invalid and unenforceable? While this Note deals with a state-
local conflict, the principles and arguments are similar to those heard often in the
federal-state context.
There are several arguments for and against state regulation. Perhaps the most
compelling reason to allow municipalities to regulate smoking is that local
governments are closer to the people; thus municipalities are more accountable and
responsive to the public. Just as a state government is more attuned to its own
citizens than the federal government, 13 a city or county council is more sensitive
to its particular constituents than the general assembly of the state. City and county
councils are better equipped to know and carry out the wishes of their constituents,
and thus should be free to allow or ban public smoking in their locality as they see
fit. And just as state officials-unlike federal officials-are directly and solely
accountable to the citizens oftheir state,'36 local governments are more immediately
accountable than the state general assembly. If a local government enacts onerous
regulations, the political process offers the electorate the opportunity to sort things
out at the next election cycle.
Another argument for enhanced local power is that cities and counties can serve
as laboratories for experimentation and should therefore be free to explore diverse
policy choices. In the same way that the states are better suited than the federal
government to experiment with novel policies, 37 a degree of local autonomy is
desirable to allow localities to test and evaluate different regulatory schemes." 38 If
the ordinance in question" (quoting Connorv. Town of Hilton Head, 314 S.C. 251,254,442 S.E.2d 608,
610 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted)), available at http://www.sccourts.org/opinions/
HTMLFiles/SC/26467.htm. In contrast, the supreme court found that a violation of the Greenville
Ordinance "constitutes an infraction or public nuisance," leading the court to conclude that the city "did
not seek to criminalize any criminal conduct." Id.
135. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992) ("Where Congress encourages
state regulation ... , state governments remain responsive to the local electorate's preferences; state
officials remain accountable to the people."); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 920 (1997) ("The
Constitution thus contemplates that a State's government will represent and remain accountable to its
own citizens.").
136. See New York, 505 U.S. at 168 69. Justice O'Connor noted,
[W]here the Federal Government compels States to regulate, the accountability
of both state and federal officials is diminished.... [l]t may be state officials who
will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the federal officials who devised
the regulatory program may remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of
their decision. Accountability is thus diminished when, due to federal coercion,
elected state officials cannot regulate in accordance with the views of the local
electorate in matters not pre-empted by federal regulation.
Id.
137. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[T]he
theory and utility of our federalism are revealed [where considerable disagreement exists], for the States
may perform their role as laboratories for experimentation to devise various solutions where the best
solution is far from clear.").
138. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50 (1973) ("[Local control]
affords some opportunity for experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition .... An analogy
to the Nation-State relationship in our federal system seems uniquely appropriate.").
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South Carolina wishes to consider following the lead of states that have enacted
comprehensive indoor smoking bans, 3 9 the experience gleaned from smaller-scale
experimentation may prove helpful in making that determination. When local
governments are free to create and attempt new ideas, the options and information
available to the state government increase when faced with similar problems.
In contrast, an argument for prohibiting local regulation is that smoking is an
issue requiring statewide uniformity. 140 Restaurant and bar owners affected by the
smoking ordinances contend that some of their patrons will shift their business to
establishments free from such regulation.14 1 While there is only anecdotal evidence
to support this contention, the conclusion seems reasonable and, if true, could
operate to the economic detriment of these restaurant and bar owners. If enough
South Carolina cities ban smoking, patrons near state borders could possibly begin
frequenting establishments in neighboring states, causing South Carolina and its
businesses to lose revenue. Thus, to avoid this deleterious scenario, statewide
uniformity all cities uniformly proscribed from enacting such ordinances is
economically desirable.
Another argument against local smoking bans is that municipalities should
allow individuals and businesses to make autonomous choices.142 Proponents ofthis
position may point to restaurants that voluntarily become nonsmoking facilities and
argue that, given sufficient consumer pressure, the entire industry may eventually
choose to self-regulate without governmental intervention. While this argument has
initial appeal, it contains a subtle flaw. Hidden in this argument is a separate issue,
namely whether cities should ban smoking. While this issue is intriguing and hotly
contested, it is beyond the scope of this Note. Here, the relevant issue is if cities
should be able to ban smoking. One can remain intellectually consistent in
believing that cities possess the authority to ban smoking but should not do so.
In light of the potential benefits to be gained from allowing cities to regulate
smoking, and considering that there is no pressing need for statewide uniformity in
this area of the law, it seems best for municipalities to be free to regulate smoking
as they wish. Depending on the ultimate outcome of the appeals pending in the two
cases discussed throughout this Note, cities may be free to regulate at will. If,
however, the local smoking ordinances are struck down, presumably on express
preemption grounds, the legislature may desire to amend the South Carolina Code
139. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-601.01 (Supp. 2007) (prohibiting smoking "in all
public places and places of employment"); CAL. LAB. CODE § 6404.5 (Supp. 2008) (prohibiting
smoking in all enclosed places of employment); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 25-14-201 to -209 (2006)
(representing an effort by the state legislature to protect nonsmokers from the harms of secondhand
smoke); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-17-1801 to -1812 (Supp. 2007) (listing various public places where
smoking is no longer permitted).
140. See, e.g., S.C. CONST. art. X, § 3 (mandating that property tax exemptions be applied
uniformly statewide); S.C. CODE ANN. § 6-10-40(1) (2004) (requiring that local changes to the state
building code may not "substantially reduce statewide uniformity of building regulations"); Town of
Hilton Head Island v. Coal. of Expressway Opponents, 307 S.C. 449, 456, 415 S.E.2d 801, 805 (1992)
("The planning, construction, and financing of state roads is a governmental service which requires
statewide uniformity.").
141. See Rick Brundrett, Justices to Rule on Legality of Smoking Bans, STATE, Jan. 6, 2008, at
Al.
142. See id. ("'The government ought to let me run my business, make my own business
decisions,' said [the owner of two Columbia, South Carolina bars]. 'People should have a choice about
whatever they want to do."').
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to allow local regulation. Probably the easiest way for the legislature to do so would
be to amend the language of section 16-15-504 to require statewide uniformity only
in regard to distribution of tobacco to minors. Furthermore, the legislature could
also amend the CIAA to expressly allow local regulation of places not included in
that Act's scope.
V. CONCLUSION
Under the general laws of South Carolina, local governments may regulate
indoor smoking. Neither the Clean Indoor Air Act nor section 16-17-504 imply a
legislative intent to preempt such local regulations. Express preemption, while a
more difficult issue, does not ultimately invalidate such ordinances under a proper
interpretation of section 16-17-504. The current interpretation of the South Carolina
constitution, however, may invalidate such ordinances. But this constitutional
interpretation 143 is troublesome and, if not narrowed or overturned, 44 severely
hinders the ability of local governments to regulate any conduct within their
jurisdictions. Allowing local governments to regulate smoking is consistent with
the policy reasoning behind Home Rule, particularly the proximity and
accountability of local governments to their constituents. Because such ordinances
are not preempted and are constitutionally sound-apart from the Connor
rule-local governments should be able to enact and enforce local smoking
legislation.
Miles Coleman
143. See supra text accompanying notes 123-33.
144. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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